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Abstract 
The open and anonymous nature of a P2P network makes 
it an ideal medium for nttnckers to spread maliciuus con- 
tent. In this paper: we describe a reputation-based trust 
management pmrocol fur P2P networks where users rate 
the reliability of parties they deal with, and share this in- 
formation with their peers. The protocol helps estnblishing 
trust among goodpeers ns well as identibing the malicious 
ones. 
Results of various simulation experiments show that the 
proposed system can be highly effective in preventing the 
spread of malicious content in P2P networks. 
1 Introduction 
A peer-to-peer (P2P) network is a computer network that 
does not have fixed clients and servers but a number of peer 
nodes that function as both clients and servers to the other 
nodes in the network. Although in general any networking 
technology that uses this model can he considered as P2P, 
suth as the “ T P  protocol used for transfemng Usenet 
news or a wireless ad hoc network, the term is most fre- 
quently used to refer to file sharing networks over the Inter- 
net, such as Gnutella, FastTrack, and Napster. In this paper, 
we also focus on P2P file sharing systems and use the term 
“P2P’ mostly to refer to this particular application of the 
more general concept. 
By the nature of its architecture, a P2P file sharing sys- 
tem provides an open, unrestricted environment for content 
sharing. However, this openness also makes it an ideal en- 
vironment for attackers to spread malicious content such as 
the VBS.Gnutella worm [ I  I ] .  
Reputation-based systems are used to establish trust 
among members of on-line communities where parties with 
no prior knowledge of each other use the feedback from 
their peers to assess the trustworthiness of the peers in the 
community [9]. One well-known such system is the rating 
scheme used by the eBay on-line auction site [SI. 
In this paper, we propose a reputation-based, distributcd 
trust architecture for P2P networks to identify malicious 
peers and to prevcnt the spreading of malicious content. The 
protocol is based on the query-rcsponse architecture of thc 
first generation P2P networks and is suitable for operation 
in a Gnutella- or Kazaa-like system. 
The protocol we propose is described in Sections 2- 4. 
Results of the simulation experiments testing the protocol’s 
effectiveness are presented in Section 5. Earlier protocols 
with a similar scope and their differences from our proposal 
arc discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper 
with a discussion of the future work necessary for a practi- 
cal deployment of our protocol. 
2 The Basic Protocol 
A query in a P2P file sharing system can return many dif- 
ferent versions of the queried resource, among which some 
may he malicious. The aim of our protocol is to distinguish 
the malicious responses from benign ones by using the rep- 
utation of ihe peers providing them. Since in P2P networks 
a central server is typically not available, our protocol relies 
on the P2P infrastructure to obtain the necessary reputation 
information when it is not locally available at the querying 
peer. 
In this section, we give a high-level description of the 
hasic protocol. The rationale for the design is discussed in 
Section 3. The security extensions on the hasic protocol are 
described in Section 4. Some relatively insignificant tech- 
nical details which could not be included in this paper due 
to the space limitations can he found in the full technical 
report [IO]. 
2.1 Trust Records and Ratings 
In our system, the outcomes of past transactions are 
stored in trust vectors, maintained by the peers that make 
the download. Every peer maintains a trust vector for every 
other peer it has dealt with in the past. 
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Trust vectors are constant-length, binary vectors of e hits, 
where is typically 8, 16, or 32. A 1 bit represents an hon- 
est transaction, a 0 represents a dishonest one. An integer 
variable accompanies each vector, specifying the number of 
significant bits in it. The result of a new transaction is writ- 
ten at the most significant hit, shifting the present bits to the 
right. The process is illustrated in Figure 1. 
genuine download 
Tmst vector: I I101000 
#ofsignificant bits: 5 
f“ B T ~ s I v c E I o ~ :  llOlOW0 
#of significant bill: 4 
Figure 1: Peer A s  update of its trust vector on B after an honest 
transaction. In this example e = 8. 
A trust vector with m significant hits is read as an m-hit 
integer and divided by 2“ for conversion into a scalar mist  
rating in the [ O ,  1) interval.‘ A separate disrnrst raring is 
also computed from the complement of the trust vector, for 
reasons explained in Section 3. An example computation of 
the trust and distrust ratings is shown in Figure 2 
Tmsf rating = = OBllti25 
Dibmbl nling = = 1).0625 
T u ~ t v e ~ t o r :  l l l O l W 0  
#of  significant bits: 5 
Figure 2: Computation of the trust and distrust ratings from the 
tmst vector. 
2.2 The Trust Evaluation Function 
The responses to a resource query are grouped according 
to the file hashes provided. Let G denote a group of peers 
that provide a certain version of the file, say fc. The frusf 
coeficienr of fc is calculated as the average of the trust 
ratings of the top BT most trusted peers in G, where BT is the 
threshold specifying the number of peers to he considered 
in a version’s trust calculation. 
If local trust information is available for fewer than OT 
peers in G, denoted by known(G), then a frust query is 
issued for randomly selected OT ~ /knolun(G)I unknown 
peers in G. 
2.3 The Trust Query Process 
The trust query process is similar to the file query process 
except that the subject of the query is a peer about whom 
trust information is inquired. The responses include the 
trust and distrust ratings the responders have on the queried 
subject. 
‘Here, the use of 2’” as the divisor instead of 2’” ~ 1 enables dis- 
tinguishing among the straight-l mt vectom according to the length m, 
favoring longer all-honest histories over shotier ones. 
The responses are sorted and weighted by the credibil- 
ity raring of the responders. Credibility ratings are derived 
from the credibility vecrors maintained by the local peer, 
which are similar to the trust vectors: A 0 in a credibility 
vector shows a failed judgment from that peer in the past, a 
1 shows a successful one. 
The threshold Bc specifies the number of responses to 
be evaluated for each trust query. The queried frusr ruf- 
ing is the average of the evaluated trust ratings, weighted 
by the credibility of their senders. That is, if peer A is- 
sued a trust query on peer B, and the responses of peers 
R I ,  Rz,  . . . , R k ,  k 5 Bc, qualify for consideration, and A’s 
credibility rating for R, is c, and R,’s trust rating for B is 
t , ,  then A’s queried trust score on B is 
The queried distrust rating is calculated in the same fashion, 
using the respondents’ distrust ratings of B. 
2.4 Update of Trust and Credibility Ratings 
After the file download is complete, a user is asked to 
judge the file as benign or malicious. If it is rated benign, 
the trust rating of the pcer(s) from whom the file is down- 
loaded is upgraded. Otherwise, the rating of the peer who 
sent the malicious content and the rating of those who con- 
tributed to its selection are downgraded. The difference be- 
tween the two cases is due to the following fact: A mali- 
cious peer may well offer a right hash during a query in the 
hope of being selected and, if selected, sends the malicious 
content. Therefore, merely a reference for a good file is not 
sufficient for upgrade of the trust rating. On the other hand, 
if a downloaded file turns out to be malicious, all peers who 
offered that file can be assumed to he malicious. 
The update of the credibility ratings is slightly more 
complex: The rating of a peer who expressed an opinion 
on a queried peer is updated only if the queried peer’s trust 
rating is updated as a result of the download. A credit rating 
update’s direction (i.e., its being negative or positive) is de- 
termined according to the opinion given and the direction of 
the trust rating that is updated: If a peer’s trust rating is up- 
graded and some peer gave a positive opinion on that peer, 
or if both the trust rating update and the opinion were neg- 
ative, then the credibility of the refemng peer is upgraded. 
Otherwise, it is downgraded. 
Another important point here is how an opinion is classi- 
fied as “positive” or “negative”. Since the distrust rating has 
priority in evaluation over the trust rating, an opinion with 
a non-zero distrust rating is considered a negative one. An 
opinion with a positive trust rating with zero distrust on the 
other hand, which implies a trust rating of 0.5 or  higher, is 
considered a positive opinion. 
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Figure 3: An illustration of the trust evaluation protocol. In response to a file query, three different replies are received among which the 
querier is interested in the first two. A trust comparison among these two versions follows. In this process, sufficient information is not 
available locally on the providers of the second version. Hence, a trust query is issued for peer 24. At the end of the calculations, the first 
version turns out to be the one with a better trust score and will be downloaded from some subset of the peers xl, z2. z3. 
The operation of our basic protocol is illustrated in Fig- of a centralized server in P2P systems in general. 
In our trust rating calculations, opinions of peers are 
weighted by their credibility. Moreover, the evaluation is re- 
stricted to a few (&- or Bc) most trusted responses. This has 
the purpose of preventing some low-trust responses discred- 
iting a reliable res'ourcelpeersupported by sufficiently many 
trusted peers, as well as limiting the number of responses to 
he authenticated, which, unless restricted in number, can be 
a performance bottleneck. 
ure 3. 
3 Design Rationale 
The idea of using the feedback from other peers to as- 
sess the trustworthiness of a resourcelpeer is a fundamental 
characteristic of reputation systems 191. In our protocol, this 
process is carried out in a distributed fashion due to the lack 
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A special feature of our trust evaluation function is the 
separate treatment of the distrust ratings. Although both 
the trust and distrust ratings are derived from the same trust 
vectors, handling the distrust ratings separately has the ad- 
ditional feature of not letting a dishonest dealing be erased 
easily by a few honest transactions, which closely models 
real-life trust relations where a single dishonest transaction 
in someone’s history is a more significant indicator than 
several honest transactions. 
An important factor to be considered in reputation-based 
systems is temporal adaptivity; that is the ability to respond 
rapidly to changing behavioral patterns. Our trust rating 
design with binary vectors makes an efficient exponential 
aging scheme with an aging factor of 0.5. Moreover, imple- 
menting the aging scheme by fixed-length registers rather 
than floating point arithmetic has the desirable feature of 
enabling peers to cleanse their history by doing a reason- 
able amount of community service after a bad deed. Note 
that this service must be done to the same person who was 
cheated, and hence a had transaction on record will take 
some time to be erased completely, proportional to e. 
Once the file version to be downloaded is decided, the 
peer to download it from is selected randomly among those 
who offered that version, not considering the trust ratings. 
This way of selection has the desirable feature of enabling 
new peers to build a reputation as well as not overloading 
the trusted peers. 
Another important design decision was to use a credi- 
bility rating system separate from the trust ratings. The 
main risk of using the trust ratings for credibility evalua- 
tion comes from coordinated attacks where some malicious 
peers do as much faithful public service as they can and 
build a strong reputation, and then use their credibility for 
supporting others who spread malicious content. Having 
separate trust and credibility rating systems preclude such 
attacks. 
4 Security Extensions 
In the section, we discuss extensions on the basic pro- 
tocol to provide secure and reliable trust information in the 
presence of active attackers. 
4.1 Key Management 
Our system makes use of digital signatures for authen- 
tication of critical messages. The core trust issue in public 
key systems is to ascertain that a public key received on-line 
indeed belongs to the claimed party. The classical solution 
to this problem is by trusted certification authorities. but this 
may not be an option in a P2P system due to its decenud- 
ized nature. In pseudonym-based systems, however, includ- 
ing most P2P systems, the question is to bind the public 
keys to pseudonyms, not to real-life identities. Hence, a nat- 
ural solution is to make the pseudonym and the public key of 
an entity the same thing. That is, in an RSA-based system 
for example, the public exponent-modulus pair (e ,n)  can 
be taken as the pseudonym of the entity using it.2 In such a 
system, there will be no question of the public key’s authen- 
ticity when the trust information from a certain pseudonym 
is to be verified. 
4.2 Authentication 
In order to be a reliable source of information, the re- 
sponses to be used in trust evaluation must be authenti- 
cated. In our protocol, this is obtained by signing the hash 
of the responses provided. For protection against replay and 
cut-and-paste attacks, the signed hash covers, among other 
fields, the ID of the querying and responding peers, a query 
ID number, and the file hash being offered. 
4.3 Denial of Service Protection 
The requirement of responding to every relevant query 
with a digital signature is likely to be an excessive burden 
on the peers. Moreover, it can easily be exploited for de- 
nial of service attacks by attackers continually issuing many 
high-match queries. To protect against this threat, a puzzle 
scheme is used adding an extra round to the protocol: In the 
initial response, the file hash is sent without any signature. 
Instead, the responding peer includes a puzzle to be solved 
by the querier, such as finding a string whose MD5 output 
matches a certain value [Z], which should be answered cor- 
rectly before a signature is issued. Then the querying peer 
decides on which file versions he is genuinely interested in 
and solves the puzzles of a limited number of the respon- 
dents for each version. 
4.4 Avoiding Fake File Downloads 
Another avenue of attack for sending malicious files is to 
provide the hash of a benign file during the query-response 
process but, if selected as the download source, to send the 
malicious file during the download. Such attacks can be de- 
tected if the hash of a downloaded file is checked before 
opening. However, the time and bandwidth of the down- 
loader would be wasted, which is exactly the purpose of 
certain attacks such as the “decoy files” [3]. 
A more effective protection is to compare the hash of the 
blocks of the file while the download is in progress. Merkle 
hash trees [8]  provide a solution of this sort. An altema- 
tive hash scheme is also possible that is more suitable for 
our protocol. In this alternative scheme, the hash of a file is 
?If the pseudonyms we desired lo be of uniform length such a an ID 
number, a one-way hash of the public key can be used. 
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computed in two stages: First, the file is divided into seg- 
ments of a certain size and the hash of each segment is com- 
puted separately; then the hash of the file is computed as the 
hash of these segment hashes. The only computational over- 
head of this method is the extra hash computation over the 
segment hashes, which would he insignificant given that the 
segments sizes are reasonably large. We believe that a seg- 
ment size in the 100KB-lMB range is a reasonable choice 
for most P2P networks. 
Our trust evaluation protocol can he made to work with 
this new hashing scheme by a simple modification: Once 
thc file version for download is selected, the querier con- 
tacts one of the peers who provided the selected hash and 
rcyucsts the detailed hash of the file. Upon receiving the 
response and verifying its correctness, the peer proceeds to 
download the file, possibly from multiple sources. During 
the download, the hash is chccked after evcry downloaded 
segment and thc connection is canceled if a mismatch oc- 
curs. 
Note that i f  an attacker sends the fake segment later in the 
download to delay detection, the benign segments down- 
loaded until that point can be used without any problem, 
saving the time and bandwidth spent. 
4.5 The Problem of Free Riders 
A problem with a quite different theme hut which may 
nevertheless benefit from our architecture is the problem of 
“free riders”; that is, the peers who use the P2P system only 
to download content but do not serve to other peers. Many 
users of Kazaa-like file sharing systems use the system as 
free riders. To tackle this problem and to discourage free 
riding, some systems determine the priority of the service 
reception of a peer according to the amount of service the 
peer has provided in the past. However, this service infor- 
mation is typically provided by the software of the client 
peer, which is easily hacked to always send the highest pos- 
sible value. Recently, reputation-based solutions are being 
proposed to overcome this problem (e.g., [6]).  
Our trust record system provides a natural infrastructure 
that can he used for evaluating the service level of the peers: 
At the time of a download, the priority of the download is 
determined according to the number of Is in the trust vec- 
tor the server peer maintains for the client peer. When the 
local information is insufficient, a trust query can he issued 
and a “service score” can he calculated from some top few 
responses. Here, unlike in the trust score calculation, the 
ranking of the responses should not be based solely on the 
credibility of the sources-since the most credible respon- 
dents may have not received any service from the client 
peer. Instead, a combination of the credibility ratings and 
the provided service scores should be used. 
5 Simulation Experiments 
We tested the performance of our protocol with simula- 
tions on various attack scenarios. Although it is not possi- 
ble to exhaust all potential attack types, testing the protocol 
with a variety of attacks gives an idea on the effectiveness 
of the protocol. The types of attackers considered in the 
simulations are, 
naive, who responds to every query with a malicious 
version of the requested file 
hypocritical, who acts like a reliable peer most of the 
time hut occasionally tries to send a malicious file 
colinhornfive, who collaborate with each olhcr in trust 
queries, expressing a positive opinion for malicious 
peers and a negative opinion for others 
pseudospoofing, who change their pseudonym period- 
ically to escape recognition-these attackers are the 
hardcst to detect and their prevention is possible only 
after honest peers build a sufficient level of trust among 
themselves. 
The simulated P2P networks operate with a Gnutella-like 
decentralized routing structure. Every peer is linked to a 
certain number of neighbors, and a query message issued by 
a peer is propagated over these links for a certain number of 
hops specified by the lTL.  The simulations are run with the 
following common parameters: 
number of peers: 1000 
number of distinct files: 1000 
10 
3 
lTL:  3 
ratio of malicious peers: 1-10% 
number of files each peer initially holds: 
number of links per peer: 
Here, the number of peers and files in the network are deter- 
mined according to the capacity of our system. The number 
of connections per peer and the lTL are chosen to make the 
area covered by a peer’s reachable neighborhood a reason- 
able fraction of the whole network-ahout 2% in this case. 
10% malicious ratio represents a high concentration of ma- 
licious peers, whereas l% is the scenario that is probably 
closer to a real-life situation. 
In a simulation run, regular users make file requests pe- 
riodically, according to a uniform distribution. If the re- 
quested file is available locally, no further action is taken. 
Otherwise, a resource query message is issued, and the pro- 
tocol proceeds as described in Section 2. Malicious peers 
may also issue file queries, basically for obtaining genuine 
files to he used for confidence building. Malicious peers are 
limited to their databases to send genuine file responses, hut 
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they are free to respond to any query maliciously. Through- 
out the simulations, we take & = 0c. denoted by 0 .  The 
inter-query time, or iqt, is the average time between two 
consecutive file queries of a peer and is used as the basic 
unit of the simulation time. 
It has been observed that the user behavior in P2P file 
sharing systems show a Zipf-like distribution where users 
can be grouped into several categories according to their in- 
terests, and within each category there are a few highly pop- 
ular files along with a large number of less popular ones [7]. 
Our simulations can he expected to give better results when 
run with a Zipf distribution since positive correlation among 
users’ behavior would result in a more rapid trust establish- 
ment among the users in the same category. We preferred 
to stick to the uniform distribution which favors our proto- 
col the least, since the file requebts in a uniform distribution 
can come from anywherc in thc domain and in our system 
it is only the attackers who are able to respond to all queries 
unrestrictedly. 
5.1 Simulation Results 
Results of our simulations are shown in Figure 4, where 
the performance metric used is 
@I: Ratio of malicious to all downloads. 
The main characteristics demonstrated by the experiments 
can be summarized as follows: 
The protocol is quite effective in preventing the ma- 
licious downloads, and can reduce it to zero within a 
short time depending on the sophistication of the at- 
tackers. 
A large degree of protection can be obtained by just 
evaluating one most trusted response, i.e., 0 = 1. Set- 
ting 0 = 2 helps against sophisticated attackers. The 
gain from 6’ > 2 appears to be negligible. 
The protocol is similarly effective for both 1 %  and 
10% malicious peer density. 
In Figure 4, we have 0 = 2, = 32. More extensive results 
with different performance metrics and different values of 0 
and e can be found in the full technical report [IO].  
6 Comparison to Related Earlier Work 
A number of protocols have been proposed recently for 
reputation-based trust management in P2P systems. In this 
section, we discuss them briefly in comparison to our pro- 
tocol. 
One of the earliest works in this area is the protocol 
by Aberer and Despotovic [ I ]  which aims to identify dis- 
honest peers by a complaint-based system. A shortcoming 
of this protocol is that it maintains only the negative feed- 
backs, providing no means for a trustworthy peer to he dis- 
tinguished from a newcomer. The trust evaluation is also 
rather simplistic, classifying every peer either as trustwor- 
thy or untrustworthy. Moreover, maintenance of  a “P-Grid” 
architecture is required on top of the existing P2P structure. 
Another protocol is the EigenTrust scheme proposed by 
Kamvaret al. [7], which evaluates the trust information pro- 
vided by peers according to their trustworthiness (i.e., using 
the trust ratings for credibility). The core of the protocol is 
a special normalization process where the trust ratings held 
by a peer are normalized to have their sum equal to 1.  Al- 
though it has some interesting properties, this normalization 
may result in the loss of important trust information. E.g., if 
there are n identical trust ratings in the database, their nor- 
malized value will be I/n. whether the originals were the 
highest or the lowest possible value. 
Another proposal with a similar scope is the protocol of 
Damiani et al. [4], which assesses the trustability of a filc 
to he downloaded by “voting” of the peers. The protocol 
makcs no distinction between the votes from trustworthy 
and nVn-tNStworthy peers, and there is no authentication 
of thc vote messages. Also, no quantitative trust mctric is 
specified for choosing among altemativc versions. An im- 
portant idea of [4] is to maintain reputations for resources 
as well as for peers. 
A study with a different hut relevant scope is a recent 
paper of Xiong and Liu [ 121 on trust evaluation in P2P e- 
commerce communities. Although they do not deal with 
the details of trust evaluation functions, they run an exper- 
imental system which utilizes a modification of the P-Grid 
scheme of [ I ] .  
7 Final Considerations 
Improvements are possible on the basic protocol to make 
it more efficient. For example, a timer mechanism can be 
used to detect and remove the trust vectors belonging to 
peers that are no longer active. Trust queries can be made 
more efficient by combining all IDS to be queried into a 
single query message, reducing the number of query and 
response messages to be handled. 
A potential improvement on the basic protocol may be 
realized by preserving the hashes of the malicious files 
downloaded. These hashes can later he used to send a wam- 
ing to the querying peer when a relevant query is received. 
This idea was originally proposed in [4] in a similar con- 
text. Our protocol can he enhanced to include this feature 
with the following modifications: The warning messages 
received in a query are grouped along with the normal re- 
sponses according to their tile hash value. If selected into 
the top 0T fur trust evaluation, a waning  message’s trust 
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Figure 4: A graphical summary of the simulation results. Naive attackers can be detected and contained quite rapidly. Hypocritical 
attackers, operating at a much lower effectiveness level, can evade detection longer; but their activity is  also contained once a sufficient 
level of trust is established among the good peers. Pseudospoofing attackers are also able to continue spreading malicious content for a 
while but become ineffective as the good peers establish trust among themselves. Collaboration does not seem to be a significant source of 
benefit to naive attackers. 
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and distrust ratings are reversed in the tNSt  score calcula- 
tion, contributing a significant distrust factor to the average. 
The limitations of our protocol must also be noted. Be- 
ing a reputation-based protocol, our system in the end relies 
on the judgment of its users. Therefore, it can he effective 
only against attacks that are discernible by the user. Never- 
theless, many attacks in P2P systems fall into this categoly, 
such as the common decoy files attacks [31. 
Another point to note is that our protocol does not distin- 
guish between malicious peers and the peers that spread ma- 
licious content due to their carelessness, which we believe 
is the right way to deal with careless peers from a practical 
point of view. On the other hand, if careless users change 
thcir attitude, they always have the ability to improve their 
reputation by serving a sufficient number of good files. 
Our protocol is designed to be compatible with most first 
generation P2P systems. However, certain optimizations 
would be needed to obtain the hest perfomance when intc- 
grating it with aspecific system. Forexample, in aGnutella- 
like network where a peer's conncctions are changed con- 
stantly to provide rapid distribution of  the content across 
the network, building a reliable reputation base can take 
too long and a malicious peer can escape recognition for 
a long time due to the constantly changing neighborhood. 
In such a system, a connection scheme where some of the 
neighbors of a peer change continually for content distnbu- 
tion and others, which are possibly determined by a longest 
prefix match on the ID, remain relatively stable for trust 
management, could be more effective for faster trust estab- 
lishment. More detailed simulations that consider this kind 
of specifics of the network where thc protocol is to bc de- 
ployed, and with a more sophisticated modeling of the at- 
tackers according to the network's possible vulnerabilities, 
would be needed to get a more realistic evaluation of the 
proposed architecture for deployment in an actual system. 
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